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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we deal with the protector control that which we used to secure AODV routing protocol in Ad 
Hoc networks. The considered system can be vulnerable to several attacks because of mobility and absence 
of infrastructure. While the disturbance is assumed to be of the black hole type, we purpose a control 
named "PC-AODV-BH" in order to neutralize the effects of malicious nodes. Such a protocol is obtained by 
coupling hash functions, digital signatures and fidelity concept. An implementation under NS2 simulator 
will be given to compare our proposed approach with SAODV protocol, basing on three performance 
metrics and taking into account the number of black hole malicious nodes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wired networks, the computers are connected by broadcast cables and they are 
characterized by their powers in terms of capacity for treatment and storage. Moreover, such 
networks offer a stable band-width, a good and inexpensive quality [11]. In the early 90’s the 
consequent evolution carried in the wireless networks made the interest of the mobile 
computing grow. The latter offers a flexible mechanism of communication enters the users 
and an access to all services available in a typical environment (fixed) through an independent 
network of the physical location (geographic) and user mobility [11]. 
 
The most usual wireless networks deployed today are based on fixed infrastructures: sites 
accommodating the base stations in the case of the cellular networks or cables for wired 
infrastructure.  A connectivity between the various elements in the network is organized and 
centralized [11].  
 
The Ad Hoc are wireless networks capable to be organized without infrastructure previously 
defined. For example from one device to another without any infrastructure [7].  Each node 
in the network is equipped with a radio interface and it is free to join, leave and move 
independently. As a result, the network topology changes rapidly. To meet the need, the 
network may change rapidly and spontaneously and configures in an autonomous way 
according to the existing connections between nodes. In the Ad Hoc networks, node should 
have the capability to function in the same time routers and terminals. Moreover, the 
communication between nodes is ensured dynamically [9].  
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When the Ad Hoc nodes communicate, it is interesting to define a good strategy for 
transferring data by taking into account at any time the characteristics of the network such as 
the dynamic topology, number of links, band-width, and network resources [10]. Moreover, 
the method adopted must offer the best routing of data. The routing protocol in a mobile Ad Hoc 
network can be categorized into two classes: proactive (definition of the routes in advance) and 
reactive (it is with the request that the route will be defined) [9]. 
 
The concern of the security in the routing operations represents a principal challenge in the design 
of the routing protocols.  Indeed, due to lack of such infrastructure or assumption of central 
administration, in contrast the traditional security solutions are not adapted to cope with the 
features of the Ad Hoc networks. Several vulnerabilities exist in these networks: manufacturing, 
modification, selfish or malicious nodes, usurpation of identity or suppression of the traffic in the 
network, the black hole attack [20], the worm hole attack [13], and so o n . 
 
Each node in the network contributes to the good performance in the routing; in contrast each 
element represents a point of vulnerability. In particular, if no mechanism is set up to make it 
possible for each node to determine the good performance and to check the coherence of the 
routing data, the node accepts the information of routing coming from any other node in the 
network. That is an attacker can send messages containing incorrect information on the network, 
in order to conduct a malicious action. 
 
For this reason, the traditional mechanisms of security and the protocols are not directly 
applicable and require a suitable securing in the Ad hoc networks. Several researches explored a 
variety of mechanisms to answer the problems of data security, and a certain number of secure 
routing protocols have been suggested in order to prevent different types of attacks (TAODV, 
ARAN and SAODV [19, 21, 22]). 
 
In this work, which is part of the Ad Hoc networks, the routing is assumed to be provided by 
using reactive routing protocol AODV. In this case, we talk about a system in the autonomous 
case. When the system is subject to a disturbance, as the case of the black hole type, it may be 
that it prevents the good routing performance because of the presence of the malicious nodes. 
Thus, we are interested with the problem of controlling the data routed through AODV in the 
presence of such a disturbance. This is the protector control of AODV protocol facing the black 
hole attack: PC-AODV-BH. This control is achieved by a coupling of the security mechanisms 
(digital signatures, hash functions) with the concept of fidelity associated with the nodes in the 
considered network. 
 
The principle of protector control consists (Qaraai et al. [16]), in the case of AODV protocol, to 
develop and implement algorithms making it possible to return the disturbed system in its 
autonomous state, while trying to neutralize the effects of black hole attacks. Hence, the 
terminology of the resulting protocol PC-AODV-BH. 
 
The organization of this paper is as follows: In section 2 we give an overview of the AODV 
routing protocol and the black hole attack. After dealing with the history of some protocols 
introduced to secure AODV protocol, we give a detailed approach followed by the proposed 
algorithms in the third section. The last section will be devoted to the simulation tests by 
considering some metrics, while varying the number of black hole attacks. A comparison of PC-
AODV-BH and SAODV protocols will be made to test the effectiveness of introduced control. 
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2. ROUTING AND ATTACKS 
 
This section provides a brief recall on the reactive AODV routing protocol and also a preview of    
the black hole attacks. In other words, it’s about the principal elements defining respectively the 
autonomous and the disturbed systems. 
 
2.1 AODV PROTOCOL 
 
The AODV was developed by Charles E. Perkins and Elizabeth M. Royer [14]. It is a reactive 
protocol based on the principle of distance vector. This protocol uses two mechanisms named 
route discovery and route maintenance. Besides the routing node by node, it builds the roads by 
using a cycle of requests called route request and route reply (RREQ and RREP) [4].  It uses 
destination sequence numbers to ensure the fresh routes and guarantees loop freedom. In the Ad 
Hoc networks, the route changes frequently because of the mobility of nodes, as a result, the 
routes maintained by certain nodes, become invalid.  The sequence numbers make it possible to 
use the fresh routes. In AODV, the route table is used to store routing information. Additionally,   
node maintains a list of precursor nodes to route through them to reach the destination. A source 
node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet on the network each time the route to the 
destination is not available or the previously entered route is inactivated.  
 
Each middle node that receives the RREQ checks its own routing table, if it is the destination, it 
sends backs an RREP (Route Reply) packet. If not, it relays the RREQ packet by broadcasting it 
to its neighbors. In the absence of response RREP, this process repeated until destination node or 
intermediate node that has a fresh enough route toward destination node receives RREQ, and in 
this way, it creates RREP message, and inversely sends along the reverse route established at 
intermediate nodes during the route discovery process to source node. The number of the RREQ 
message steps increases by passing through each node.  Nodes sending RREP updates the 
sequence number for the source node in its own route tables. The source receives a RREP when 
the sequence number of RREQ is smaller than the sequence number of its routing table, or the 
same sequence number with a smaller hop count, the newer RREQ is removed. If there are two 
routes toward receiving destination, then the node selects the route with maximum sequence 
number or if sequence numbers are the same, the message with minimum number of steps is 
selected [23]. Sequence number acts as a time stamp. By using sequence numbers, nodes can 
recognize those that sent and transferred information, and which node is newer than the others 
[24]. The intermediate nodes and the source node store the next hop information. The routing 
table entry contains the following information: 
 
Destination node, Destination sequence number, Next hop, Number of hops, Hop Count, Active 
neighbours for the route, and expiration timer. 
 
 
 
Figure2.1: AODV route discovery process 
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From the figure 2.1, the source node S broadcast the RREQ to reachable neighbors A, B and 
C to find the best possible route to the destination node D. After receiving the RREQ, node 
A, B and C either: 
 
• Send out the RREP message to the source node if it is the destination or it is an 
intermediate node with a fresh enough route to the destination with a higher sequence 
number or equal to   the RREQ message, 
• Update the routing table and broadcasting the RREQ until the destination node or 
intermediate node with fresh enough route. 
 
The destination node D receiving the RREQ message from node A and forwards the RREP 
message to this node. Node A sends the RREP message to node S and updates its routing 
table. Source node S also update the routing table for the new route to the destination node D 
using the AODV recvReply() function. The explanation of normal recvReply() mechanism is 
described as follows: 
 
 
Algorithm 1 Algorithm of AODV recvReply() function 
RecvReply (Packet P) 
If (P.dst no entry in Routing Table RT) Then 
Add entry of P.dst to RT 
End 
Select dst_seqno from RT 
If (P.dst_seqno>RT.dst_seqno or P.dst_seqno=RT.dst_seqno and P.hops < RT.hops) Then 
Update RT entry with P 
Send data packets to the route in RT 
Else If (routing is UP for P) Then 
Forward packet P 
Else discards P 
End End If 
End 
 
 
2.2 BLACK HOLE ATTACK 
 
Routing protocols are having a variety of attacks. In which a malicious node sends forged RREP 
packet to inform the nodes of that it has the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to 
intercept, we talk about black hole attack [20]. In other words, a malicious node uses the routing 
protocol (such as AODV) to promote false information of having shortest path to the destination 
node or to the packet it wants to intercept, then black hole will  have the accessibility in replying 
to the route request and creates a reply where an extremely short route is advertised. If the 
malicious reply reaches node before the reply from the actual node, a forged route created. When 
the attacker inserts itself between the communicating nodes, it is able to drag the packets towards 
them [3]. And when the source receives these false RREP, it starts transmitting the data packets to 
the black hole node instead of transmitting them to the destination. 
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Figure2.2: Routing discovery in AODV with black hole attack 
 
For example in the figure 2.2, the source node (node 1) broadcasts a route request packet RREQ     
to its neighbours to find a route to the destination node (node 3).  It is assumed that routing table   
of the intermediate node 2 has a route to the destination node and node 5 is a malicious one in      
the network. So the node 5 automatically sends a false RREP to (node 1) without checking the 
routing table. The malicious RREP attained rapidly to the node 1 before the responses of other 
nodes in the network. Now, node 1 accepts the shortest route through the node 5 and sends 
application layer data to the node 3 via this node rejecting other RREP packets (in this case, a 
RREP packet from node 2). The black hole node drops all data packets rather than forwarding 
them to the destination, unfortunately, source node sends the data packets assuming that this data 
would reach safely the destination node. The intention of implementing a black hole in the 
network may be as simple as disrupting the normal network operation to as severe as man in the 
middle attack or denial of service attack. The following code will be added in the AODV protocol 
to generate the false answers by the black hole attacker: recvRequest(Packet*) function. 
 
  Algorithm 2 Extract of black hole algorithm 
if 
   (rt && blackhole == 1) Then 
assert (rq- > rq_dst == rt- >  rt_dst); 
sendReverse (rq- > rq_src); // IP Destination 
rq- > rq_timestamp); // timestamp 
rt- > pc_insert (rt0- > rt_nexthop); 
rt0- > pc_insert(rt- > rt_nexthop); 
Packet::free(p); 
End If 
  
 
3. AODV CONTROL 
 
Security in Ad Hoc networks is an essential component, especially for those security-sensitive 
applications. We analyze the security in Ad Hoc based on the following attributes:  Integrity to 
guarantee that the messages of routing exchanged between the entities were never corrupted. 
Authentication to verify the identity of an entity or a node in the network and the non-repudiation 
to verify that the sender and recipient are parties that they say have respectively sent or received 
the message [17]. In the case of the AODV routing protocol, many solutions have been explored. 
Our proposed approach will be developed basing on these solutions and using the concept of 
fidelity levels. 
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3.1RELATED WORKS 
 
Security solutions are always been one of the most essential important issue in the Ad Hoc 
network communication. Various methods have been developed to protect the network from 
black hole with the AODV protocol. We will discuss several security solutions offered by 
researchers for this kind of attack. 
 
The ARIADNE protocol [8] offers a solution that provides authentication point-to-point of 
routing messages using secret key hash functions (HMAC: Hash-based Message 
Authentication Code). However, to ensure a secure authentication, ARIADNE is based on 
TESLA [15] which is a protocol that ensures safe authentication during broadcasts. Each 
node has a secret key that allows it to calculate a hash chain which is subsequently used as 
follows: when it transmits a route request message, the node adds an HMAC calculated on the 
entire message with the last hash still not used in the chain. If a route replayed to a particular 
node, this one reveals the value used in the route request. When all nodes on the way perform 
this operation, the path is authenticated. To function, ARIADNE requires that all nodes in the 
network are synchronized (through use of TESLA) and that each one of them knows the last 
value of the hash function of all others. This extension makes it possible to make safe the 
protocol against the attacks by modification and manufacturing but is still vulnerable to 
egoistic behavior. 
 
Xiaoqi et al. [21] gave a TAODV (Trusted Ad Hoc on Demand Routing Protocol) to secure 
AODV, it’s a routing protocol based on applying trust model to secure mobile Ad Hoc 
network. TAODV has several salient features like: the trust and trust relationship among 
nodes that can be represented, calculated and combined for efficient routing; a malicious 
node will eventually be detected and denied to the network and the performance of the 
system is improved by avoiding requesting and verifying certificates at every routing step. 
 
Sanzgiri et al. [19] designed a secure AODV algorithm which called ARAN. In this protocol, 
nodes use public key certificates to authenticate themselves to other nodes during the routing 
process. ARAN relies on the use of authentication, non-repudiation and message integrity in 
Ad Hoc networks by using a cryptographic certificate which is followed by a route 
instantiation process that ensures end-to-end security services. The main disadvantage that 
ARAN uses the trusted certification server and its requires every node to sign the message 
before transmitting, which is very costly in terms of power and the size of the routing 
messages  increase at each hop. 
 
Another example of protocol based on the reputation was presented by Buchegger and 
Boudec [5]. CONFIDENT (Cooperation of Node Fairness in Dynamic Ad-hoc Network) 
interacts with the misbehaving node in the network. The reputation system based 
CONFIDANT scheme punishes the misbehaving nodes by the detection and the isolation 
from the network, but if the nodes use limited transmission power this protocol cannot work 
correctly in network. 
 
Zapata have proposed the SAODV [22] as an extension of the AODV, that can be used to 
protect the routing messages (RREQs, RREPs, and RERRs), based on public key 
cryptography. SAODV use two security mechanisms: digital signatures and hash chains. The 
first are used to authenticate RREQ and RREP messages and the second are used to 
authenticate the hop count, the only changeable information in the packets. A hash chain is 
formed by repeatedly applying a one way hash function to a seed. SAODV requires the 
existence of suitable asymmetric crypto system, where each node has a pair signature key. 
Furthermore, each node is capable to acquire and verify the association between the address 
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and the public key of other nodes that participate in the Ad Hoc network. However, the use 
of hash chains does not make it possible to prevent all the attacks on the number of hops. 
Also, although the hash hop count prevents a prospective malicious node to announce shorter 
routes that in reality, nothing prevents an attacker to increase arbitrarily the length of the 
routes. Indeed, such a node can apply the hash function several consecutive times before 
relaying a packet, and then the route appears longer than it is in reality [22]. Thus, SAODV 
has disadvantages, nothing prevents a node from leaving a hop count unchanged or 
increasing it arbitrarily. Malicious node can acquire routes by consistently declaring high hop 
counts and it can impersonate another node while forwarding a fake RREP. In addition, in 
the event that there are several attackers accomplices, an attack of type black hole can always 
be launched and the number of hops can even be decremented on arrival, in a transparent 
way for the other nodes. Hence, encryption solution approaches do not address packet 
dropping by a black hole node.  
 
A mechanism has been proposed by Vishnu K et al. [13], it is capable to detect and remove 
the collaborative malicious nodes which introduce huge packet drop from network. A 
purpose of Backbone network consists of group of strong nodes in terms of battery power 
and these nodes can be allowed to allocate the RIP to the newly arrived nodes. Before 
transmitting data packets, the source node asks the backbone network to allocate RIP 
address. When the backbone network assigns the RIP address, the source node sends RREQ 
to search for destination and also for allocated RIP. If the source node only receives the 
RREP from the destination then network is safe, but if RREP comes from RIP then it implies 
that adversary might be existed in the network. As a result, the source node sends a monitor 
message to alert these neighborhoods. Then the neighbor nodes broadcast this alert message 
through the whole network and it sends a reply message to the source node that there is black 
hole node in the network. 
 
3.2 PROPOSED APPROACH 
 
3.2.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The vulnerability of an Ad Hoc may take place once the latter is the subject of an attack. 
Malicious nodes can perform many types of attacks for the dysfunction of the network, 
especially at the time of the routing between the mobile equipments. In our case, the routing 
is supposed to be provided by the AODV protocol which is subject to a black hole attack. 
The presence of this kind of attack degrades the performances in terms of security and 
efficiency.  
 
In order to improve the prevention of this protocol against the black hole attack, our 
approach consists in a coupling of security mechanisms used in the SAODV protocol and the 
concept of fidelity which is closely related to the nodes in the Ad Hoc network. The resulting 
algorithm uses the cryptography with public key through the digital signatures and hash 
functions, with the addition of a fidelity table where in every participating node will be 
attributed a fidelity level that acts as a measure of trustworthiness of that node. With on this 
basis, the PC-AODV-BH protocol is proposed to select and maintain the safer routes for the 
routing data while neutralizing the effect of malicious nodes trying to cooperate with in the 
network to disturb its operation. The contribution of PC-AODV-BH protocol to improve the 
security of AODV is a simple idea considering the consistency of secure AODV protocol 
(SAODV) in terms of cryptographic tools, but their connection with the fidelity of nodes has 
opened other ways such as the comparison between the two protocols in terms of efficiency 
facing the black hole disturbance. 
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3.2.2 MECHANISMS OF SAODV PROTOCOL 
 
In order to secure the AODV protocol, Zapata [22] conceived the SAODV protocol, a secure 
variant based on digital signatures and hash functions. 
 
The role of a hash chains is to keep the integrity of the hop count which is supposed to be 
incremented at each hop. In such a way that enables the intermediate or the destination node 
that receives the messages to verify that the hop count has not been decremented by a 
malicious node [22]. This function is widely used in cryptography, in order to reduce the size 
of data to be processed by the encryption function. Indeed, the main feature of a hash 
function to produce a hash data is to say a condensate of these data. This digest has a fixed 
size and which the value differs depending on the function. Among the usual functions, we 
can cite (MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-2) [6]. 
 
When in their turn, digital signatures authenticate the non-mutable data in the RREQ and 
RREP packets. That means that they sign everything but not the hop count of the AODV 
messages and the Hash from the SAODV extension. The final destination node signs the 
RREP generated by an intermediate, so that is the main problem in the application of the 
digital signatures. To remedy this problem, SAODV has two types of signatures as the single 
(SS) and double (DS) signature [22]. The SS is used to send a RREP request of the 
destination and the DS is used for sending the route response from the intermediate nodes, if 
it has enough new roads. Single signature is applicable in the route discovery mechanism 
because it is difficult to have enough paths by intermediate nodes. If disturbances occurred 
during the data transmission process, the source node resets the route discovery process. 
Moreover, the time to generate the RREP be it from the destination or from the intermediate 
nodes, and the signing processes are applicable and also the treatment steps of SAODV 
applied by the intermediate and the destination nodes. 
 
3.2.3 FIDELITY 
 
In each node in the network, the fidelity is basically considered as an integer number or a 
counter that is associated with it. This concept contributes to maintain the security of the 
network while measuring what one calls the fidelity levels [12, 18]. In other words, when the 
data packets are forwarded successfully, this counter is increased. According to the loyal 
participation of nodes in the network, their fidelity levels are updated. After successful 
reception of the packets by the destination node, this latter replies by sending an 
acknowledgement packet to the source. Due to this acknowledgement the intermediate nodes 
fidelity level will be incremented and the packet is exchanged. If no acknowledgement is 
received by the source node within a timer event, the intermediate node level will be 
decremented and also of the next hop of the intermediate node. The fidelity tables are 
exchanged periodically between the participating nodes in the network.  
In the arrival of positive ACK, the source node increment the fidelity levels of the 
corresponding nodes and the fidelity values are exchanged (figure 3.1).  
 
In the literature, there exist various definitions of this concept.  In our work we characterize 
the latter by the fidelity level of each intermediate node i. It is the degree of participation in 
the network operations. In other words; it is through the reports of transfer and reception of 
each node. Thus, the fidelity level φi of the node i is given by: 
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  	
 
 
Where MT (resp. MR) is the number of forward (resp. received) messages by the node i and [X] 
indicate the integer part of the real X. 
 
Whenever we observe that the fidelity level value of a particular node is greater than that of 
another node then we can conclude that the one having the greater value is more durable than the 
other from whose value is greater. Because of a node with greater value signify that it is an 
experienced node in the network and it has exchanged packets most correctly than other. When 
the level of a node drops to 0 [12], it implies there is no packets faithfully forwarding and the 
node is considered to be a malicious node and it is eliminated from the network. When black hole 
is detected it should to be declared to the other nodes in the network. This is accomplished by 
sending alarm packets. When a node receives an alarm packet passed to the entire network, so 
it can identify and eliminate the use of the black hole. Figure 3.2 shows the behavioral 
process where the black holes working as a team have been eliminated from the whole network.  
 
                                
Figure3.1: Receiving acknowledgement and 
broadcasting fidelity packets 
Figure3.2:  Black hole nodes elimination
 
3.2.3 PC-AODV-BH ALGORITHM 
 
To summarize the followed procedures in our approach, we present below an extract of the 
resulting algorithm. It is subdivided into three principal steps according to the specification of the 
source, intermediate and destination nodes. 
 
Algorithm 3 PC-AODV-BH Algorithm 
Step1 (Source node): Diffusion of the RREQ packet. 
   1. The hash function generated ← 0 
   2. RREQ secure ← Original RREQ + hash chain   protection + digital signature + protection 
key of the node 
Step2 (Intermediate node): Receiving RREQ Packets. 
Int			  , φc 
While (destination) Do 
Receiving secure RREQ 
If (INaddr == RREQ.DESTaddr) Then 
Send the RREP   RREP + Hash Chain protection + digital signature + protection key 
EndIF 
Calculate AVG_φ_LEVEL = φ_IN + φ_nexthop 
If (φ_IN > φc and φ_nexthop > φc) Then 
Send the data 
EndIf
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Repeat until a maximum Time to live value. 
End 
Step3 (Destination node): Receiving the secure RREP packets. 
Time = current time value+ timer value 
While (current time value ≤ time) do 
If (ACK is received) then 
Increment φ_IN and φ_nexthop 
Else decrement φ_IN et φ_nexthop 
If (Fidelity level of a node = 0)) then 
Remove the node from neighbour table and fidelity table. 
An alarm packet is generated and diffused to all neighboring nodes concerning the malicious 
node. 
 
The source node forwards a secure and protected RREQ with a digital signature towards its 
neighbours. As soon as the intermediate nodes receive it this request, if one of them is the 
destination node, then it generates a uncast RREP encrypts and send back in the reverse 
route. Else if the node is the intermediate one, the calculation of the fidelity level for each 
node will start to select the best among them. A comparison between the average of fidelity 
level of the node of the current level and that in the next hop with a threshold value noted φc, 
makes it possible to authorize or prevent the transfer of data. If the average value of the 
fidelity level is higher than the φc value, there will automatically be a sending of data 
packets. On receiving the data packets by the destination node, this latter will send a positive 
acknowledgement to the source, by which the intermediate node’s level will be 
incremented. If within a specified time interval, if the source node doesn’t receive the 
positive acknowledgement it will decrement the intermediate node’s level to identify the 
cooperative black holes. In the case where the fidelity level drops to 0, it implies that there is 
no packets faithfully forwarding and the node is considered to be a black hole node and it is 
removed from the routing and fidelity tables and not only it is eliminated from the network. 
  
4. SIMULATION 
 
Context: To analyze the behavior of Ad Hoc routing protocols, for our simulations based on 
NS2 simulator, we use a CBR (Constant Bit Rate) application. All the data packets CBR are 
generated between nodes using a traffic generator which creates randomly CBR connections 
that start at moments uniformly distributed between 0 and 60 seconds with a pause time 
equal to 10 seconds. The size of data is 512 bytes. Mobility scenarios are generated using a 
random way   point model (RWP) by varying the mobile nodes moving in an area of 500m x 
500m. The number of nodes is fixed in 35. 
 
                Table 1 – Simulation parameters 
 
 
Parameter Value 
Simulator NS2 
Number of Nodes 35 nodes 
Traffic Type Constant Bit Rate       
CBR 
Mobility Model 
Random 
Waypoint 
Terrain area 500 m*500 m 
Simulation Time 60 seconds 
Packet Size 512 bytes 
Routing Protocols AODV, SAODV, 
PC-AODV-BH 
Pause time 10 seconds 
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In table 1 we summarize the simulation parameters of different protocols used in this work. In 
order to evaluate the performance of concerned routing protocols, the following three metrics are 
considered: 
 
(i) End-to-End Delay: this is the average delay between the sending of data packets by the 
source and the successfully receiving it by the destination. 
(ii) Throughput: this is the amount of transmitted information by a communication 
channel according to a given time interval. 
(iii) Packet loss: this metric informs us about the amount between the generated and 
received packets during the time of communication. 
 
The variation of these three metrics is given according to time, and they are related to the 
autonomous, disturbed and controlled cases of the AODV routing protocol state. 
 
 Autonomous system: From the table 1, the performance evaluation of the network according to 
the  three  metric  ones above,  while  using  the routing  protocol  AODV,  gave  the  following 
results (figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). 
 
    
 
Figure4.1: End to end delay                      Figure4.2: Throughput of communication 
 
 
 
                                                       Figure4.3: Packets loss 
 
  
Figure4.4: End to end delay in the presence of           Figure4.5: Throughput of communication in    the 
presence of attack                                                  the presence of attack 
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Figure4.6: Packets loss in the presence of attack 
 
Controlled system: When the network described in table 1 undergoes a disturbance of the type 
1, 2 or 5 black holes, our objective is to be able to cancel their effects using SAODV and PC-
AODV- BH protocols, and then to compare the two controls applied in terms of effectiveness 
of safety of AODV routing deal with such threats. Then, an implementation of the two 
protocols enables us to obtain the figures 4.7 - 4.15. 
 
  
 
Figure4.7: Comparison of the end to end delays           Figure4.8:  Comparison of the throughputs with  
oneblack hole                                               of communication with one black hole 
 
 
 
 
Figure4.9:  Comparison of the packets loss with one black hole 
 
                     
 
Figure4.10: Comparison of the end to end delays         Figure4.11: Comparison of the throughputs 
with two black holes                                                      of communication with two black holes 
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Figure4.12: Comparison of the packets loss with two black holes 
 
  
Figure4.13: Comparison of the end to end delays         Figure4.14: Comparison of the throughputs 
with five black holes                                                      of communication with five black holes 
 
 
 
Figure4.15: Comparison of the packets loss with five black holes 
 
Discussion results: The figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 represent respectively the variation of the end-
to-end delay, the throughput of communication and the quantity of packages lost in the 
AODV routing according to the time. It is about a normal evolution of this protocol, because 
what concerns us is the control of this protocol facing the black hole attacks. 
 
In the presence of this kind of attack, the behavior of AODV is modified.  Indeed, the figure 
4.4 shows that the end-to-end delay is proportional to the number of black hole attacks over 
the entire interval of time. As this metric is a major challenge which any Ad Hoc network 
seeks to minimize, its increase based on malicious nodes is due to the cooperation of the 
latter for the degradation of the receptions in the entire network. 
In a similar way, the increase in the quantity of the packets loss (figure 4.6) is mainly the 
result of the black hole attack which consists in falsifying the borrowed routes and the 
cooperation of the attackers as well. The figure 4.5 shows the effect of black holes attacks on 
the throughput of communication in the network. 
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The observed decrease, compared to undisturbed AODV, is due to the fact that the bandwidth 
is also shared by malicious nodes that cooperate and contribute to the transfer and the 
reception of the data by emulating the source by erroneous information. 
 
The objective of our approach is to be able to make the disturbed system, which is in other 
words the Ad Hoc network in its autonomous state by using a protector control. From the 9 
figures 4.7 - 4.15, we observe that the curves obtained by the implementation of SAODV and 
PC-AODV-BH protocols are approximately close to those corresponding to the case of the 
routing AODV in the autonomous case. In other words, these two protocols not only made it 
possible to decrease the end to end delay and packets loss, but increased the throughput of 
communication, as well that is caused by different malicious nodes and their cooperation. It 
should be noted that, even if there is not a remarkable increase in the throughput, the two 
protocols remain effective for the protection of the AODV protocol against black hole attack, 
since malicious nodes share the channel or bandwidth with other nodes in the network. 
 
That being, one notes that the two protocols of control are able to defend the AODV routing 
in the three situations of attacks (1, 2 and 5 black holes), for the considered metric. Moreover, 
the figures 4.7 - 4.15 show that our proposed protocol PC-AODV-BH is more efficient than the 
SAODV protocol. That is a consequence of the use of the fidelity levels for choosing the safest 
route taking into account at the same time the current level and that of the next hop. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this work, we tackled a control problem of the AODV routing protocol in the presence of    the 
black hole attacks in the mobile Ad Hoc networks. The attackers can easily be deployed within 
the network to disturb its operation. We suggested a realizable solution to control the AODV 
protocol to this type of attack: it is the PC-AODV-BH protocol. This is a combination of public 
key cryptography mechanisms and the concept of fidelity levels which are associated to each Ad 
Hoc nodes. The implementation of the resulting algorithm, according to the throughput of 
communication, packets loss and end to end delay, has shown that the proposed protocol made it 
possible to answer the objective of this work. On the one hand, the PC-AODV-BH was able to 
neutralize approximately the effects of cooperation black holes. Besides, it is considered as an 
improvement of SAODV protocol owing to the fact that it treats at the same time the current level 
of node and that of the next hop through the injection of the fidelity. 
 
In the future, we plan to extend and develop the security mechanisms for other Ad Hoc routing 
protocols performance simulation and also for the delay tolerant networks (DTN) as in the case 
for example of the works being developed in [1, 2]. 
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